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ABSTRACT
We consider a calculus of resources and processes as a ba-
sis for modelling decision-making in multi-agent systems.
The calculus represents the regulation of agents’ choices us-
ing utility functions that take account of context. Associ-
ated with the calculus is a (Hennessy–Milner-style) context-
sensitive modal logic of state. As an application, we show
how a notion of ‘trust domain’ can be defined for multi-agent
systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mathematical modelling is a key tool in designing and rea-
soning about the complex systems of systems upon which
the world depends. For modelling complex information pro-
cessing systems, including both logical and physical compo-
nents, the classical theory of distributed systems — see, for
example, [13] for an elegant account — provides a suitable
conceptual basis [11] for a modelling discipline. Executable
modelling languages are important supporting tools, provid-
ing methods for simulating — using both Monte Carlo and
what-if methods — systems that are too complex for useful
analytical solvable descriptions. Techniques such as model
checking can be applied in sufficiently constrained circum-
stances [11].
In this paper, we show how a compositional mathematical
systems modelling theory — which is grounded in process al-
gebra [28, 29] and logical resource semantics [32, 34, 35, 11],
which has been developed in detail by some of us elsewhere
[12, 9, 10, 11], and which is supported by an execution engine
and a model checker [11] — can be extended to include an
account of decision-making by agents as they execute within
models.
Our approach introduces into the account of processes a
notion of utility that associates values to the agents’ choices.
Our addition of utility is formulated so as to support a key
measure of decision-making in multi-agent systems: agents
make their decisions in the context provided by the other
agents that are executed within the model, so that different
decision paths occur in different contexts. As is usual in
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the process-algebraic approach to modelling, the language
of processes is associated with a logic of state, in the sense of
Hennessy and Milner [11], in which propositional assertions
describe properties of the states of the model. In this paper,
these logical judgements are also context-dependent.
In Section 2, we provide a brief introduction to our back-
ground modelling theory [11] and in Section 3 we explain our
utility-theoretic approach to modelling decision-making. In
Section 4, we explain our contextual process calculus with
utility and, in Section 5, we explain its associated logic. We
conclude, in Section 6, with (a sketch of) an application of
our ideas to the concept of a ‘trust domain’. We provide
an extended derivation of the example used in this paper in
Appendix A, and full proofs of all claims in [2].
2. SYSTEMSMODELLINGBACKGROUND
While the notion of process has been explored in some
detail by the semantics community, concepts like resource
have usually been treated as second class ([30] is a partial
exception). From the point-of-view of a theorist, there are
many advantages in doing this. We have taken the oppo-
site view [12, 9, 10, 11]: we explore what can be gained by
developing an approach in which the structures present in
modelling languages are given a rigorous treatment as first-
class citizens in a theory. In particular, we ensure that each
component — locations, resources, and processes — is han-
dled compositionally. These key structural components are
considered, drawing upon distributed systems theory (e.g.,
[13]), as follows:
Location: Places are connected by (directed) links. Loca-
tions may be abstracted and refined provided the connectiv-
ity of the links and the placement of resources is respected.
Mathematically, the axioms for locations [9] are satisfied
by various graphical structures, including simple directed
graphs and hyper-graphs, as well as various topological con-
structions [12, 9, 10, 11];
Resource: The notion of resource captures the compo-
nents of the system that are manipulated by its processes
(see below). Resources include things like the components
used by a production line, the tools on a production line,
computer memory, system operating staff, or system users,
as well as money. Conceptually, the axioms of resources
are that they can be combined and compared. Mathemati-
cally, we model this notion using (partial commutative) re-
source monoids [32, 12, 9, 10, 11]. That is, structures
R = (R,, ◦, e) with carrier set R, preorder , and par-
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tial binary composition ◦ with unit e, and which satisfies
the bifunctoriality condition: R  R′ and S  S′ and R ◦ S
is defined implies R′ ◦ S′ is defined and R ◦ S  R′ ◦ S′, for
all R,S,R′, S′ ∈ R. In this paper, the order  is always
taken to be equality. Let R be a given resource monoid;
Process: The notion of process captures the (operational)
dynamics of the system. Processes manipulate resources in
order to deliver the system’s intended services. Mathemati-
cally, we use algebraic representation of processes based on
the ideas in [28], integrated with the notions of resource and
location [12, 9, 10, 11].
Let Act be a commutative monoid of actions, with multi-
plication written as juxtaposition and unit 1. Let a, b ∈ Act,
etc. The execution of models based on these concepts, as for-
mulated in [12, 9, 10, 11], is described by a transition system
with a basic structural operational semantics judgement [33,
28] of the form
L,R,E
a−→ L′, R′, E′,
which is read as ‘the occurrence of the action a evolves the
process E, relative to resources R at locations L, to become
the process E′, which then evolves relative to resources R′
at locations L′’.
The meaning of this judgement is given by a structural
operational semantics [33, 28]. The basic case, also know as
‘action prefix’, is the rule
L,R, a : E
a−→ L′, R′, E′
μ(L,R, a) = (L′, R′).
Here μ is a ‘modification’ function from locations, resources,
and actions (assumed to form a monoid) to locations and
resources that describes the evolution of the system when an
action occurs. Neglecting locations for now, partial function
μ : Act×R → R is a modification if it satisfies the following
conditions for all a, b, R, S: μ(1, R) = R; if R◦S and μ(a,R)◦
μ(b, S) are defined, then μ(ab,R ◦ S) = μ(a,R) ◦ μ(b, S).
There are also rules giving the semantics to combinators
(which together form a a complete set for enumerating r.e.
graphs) for concurrent composition, choice, and hiding —
similar to restriction in SCCS and other process algebras
(e.g., [28, 29] — as well for recursion. For example, the rule
for synchronous concurrent composition of processes is
L,R,E
a−→ L′, R′, E′ M,S, F b−→ M ′, S′, F ′
L ·M,R ◦ S,E × F ab−→ L′ ·M ′, R′ ◦ S′, E′ × F ′
,
where we presume, in addition to the evident monoidal com-
positions of actions and resources, a composition on loca-
tions. The rules for the other combinators, with suitable
coherence conditions on the modification functions, follow
similar patterns [11]. Note that our choice of a synchronous
calculus retains the ability to model asynchrony [28, 29, 14]
(this doesn’t work the other way round).
Associated with this transition semantics is a modal logic,
given in the sense of Hennessy and Milner [19], with satis-
faction relation L,R,E |= φ read as ‘property φ holds of
the process E executing with resources R at locations L’.
In developing our subsequent theory, we will, for brevity
and simplicity, suppress locations, working with a calculus
and associated logic of resources and processes, based on
judgements of the form R,E
a−→ R′, E′ and R,E |= φ, re-
spectively. Whilst this simplification represents some loss of
generality (see [11] for more detail), the essential ideas are
not significantly affected (and, indeed, some aspects of loca-
tion can be coded within resource). In our discussion of the
concept of a trust domain, in Section 6, the intuitive need
for location, be it ‘logical’ or ‘physical’, is apparent and we
revisit the concept of location there.
The logic includes — in addition to the usual additive con-
nectives, quantifiers, and modalities that are familiar from
Hennessy-Milner logic — multiplicative connectives, quan-
tifiers, and modalities [12, 9, 10, 11]. For example, dropping
locations for brevity, multiplicative conjunction is defined
by the logical decomposition of the system, as follows:
R,E |= φ1 ∗ φ2 iff there are R1, R2 and E1, E2 s.t.
R = R1 ◦R2, E ∼ E1 × E2, and
R1, E1 |= φ1 and R2, E2 |= φ2.
Here ∼ is bisimulation, explained in detail for this set-up
in [12, 9, 10, 11], where treatments of location can also be
found.
The action modalities work just as in Hennessy–Milner
logic. For example,
R,E |= 〈a〉φ iff for some R′, E′ s.t. R,E a−→ R′, E′
and R′, E′ |= φ.
The multiplicative version of this rule would permit the evo-
lution by action a to employ additional resource; that is, for
some S, R′, and E, R◦S,E a−→ R′, E′. Details and theoret-
ical development may be found in [12, 9, 10, 11]. Although
the basic logic of bunched implications, with intuitionistic
additives and multiplicatives, is decidable [17], its counter-
part with classical additives, widely known as ‘Boolean BI’
and the basis of Separation Logic [37], is not [6, 18]. We
conjecture that the undecidability of Boolean BI implies the
undecidability of the logic presented here.
In addition to the structural components of models, we
consider also the environment within which a system exists:
Environment : All systems exist within an external en-
vironment, which is typically treated as a source of events
that are incident upon the system rather than being explic-
itly stated. Mathematically, environments are represented
stochastically, using probability distributions that are sam-
pled in order to provide such events [12, 9, 10, 11].
The modal logic discussed above can also be extended to
the stochastic world, but an account of this is beyond our
present needs and scope. Related work can be found in
[38]. Logical reasoning about distributed systems has also
been studied by Barwise and Seligman [4]. We provide full
proofs of all claims made in this paper in the accompanying
technical report [2].
3. MODELLING DECISION-MAKING
One use of the process component within our models is
to represent agents within a system as they explore their
worlds, making decisions between the choices that are avail-
able to them. In the set-up described so far, as presented
in [12, 9, 10, 11], we have considered (again, suppressing
location, for brevity) an operational rule for choice of the
form
R,Ei
a−→ R′, E′
R,
∑
i∈I Ei
a−→ R′, E′
,
where I is an indexing set. This rule is understood, in the
style of structural operational semantics [33], read from con-
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clusion to premisses, as follows: the sum of the processes can
evolve by an action a, to become R′, E′ if one of its sum-
mands can evolve by the action a to become R′, E′. In other
words, there is a set of possible evolutions each element of
which leads to the evolution of the sum.
Models of distributed systems often capture situations in
which an agent or group of agents is exploring a world and
interacting with it and themselves. In such cases, a pro-
cess containing choices of the kind discussed represents the
choices made by agents as they evolve. It is therefore use-
ful to extend our modelling theory to provide an account of
agents’ decision-making.
Our approach, applying our methodology of incorporat-
ing representations of system modelling components as first-
class citizens, is to model agents’ decision-making by de-
veloping a utility-carrying version of the location-resource-
process calculus sketched above. It is possible to encode
some notions of location in the resource component; for
brevity and simplicity, we follow this approach to location
for the remainder of this paper. We return, in particular, to
the strengths of using location in modelling when we con-
sider trust domains in Section 6.
The key idea is to replace the simple choice combinator
described above with the utility-dependent choice (or sim-
ply sum)
∑
i∈I
u Ei, in which an agent has a choice between
alternatives Ei, and its preference is codified by the util-
ity u ∈ U . The operational rules of the calculus ensure
that this preference takes into account the wider context in
which the choice is embedded. For example, if the choice
R, a :E+u b :F (here we use an infix notation) occurs within
a wider context R ◦ S, (a :E +u b :F ) × G, then preference
will be determined by the utility calculations
u(R ◦ S, a :E ×G) and u(R ◦ S, b :F ×G). (1)
If the former is greater than the latter, the a : E option will
be chosen. An occurrence of the same choice R, a :E+u b :F
within a different context, such as R ◦ T, (a :E +u b :F )×H
with G 
= H or S 
= T , will have different utility calculations,
and may result in b : F being chosen instead.
Many process calculi include a form of prioritized sum, for
example [41]. In prioritized sums, say w · a : E + w′ · b : F ,
with w > w′, the option a : E is always chosen in any context
in which both a and b are available (which they may not be,
because of restriction operations). In contrast, our utility-
based sum can make different choices in different contexts
even when the same options are available.
In our set-up, resource-process contexts correspond to the
semantical notion of world. Utility functions are simply
given, being aspects of agents described in the model by
the modeller. A preference order u on worlds is induced,
in the usual way, by: R,E u S, F iff u(R,E) ≥ u(S, F ),
for all R,E and S, F . This means that the mathematical
structures we are considering appear to be similar to those
used to give a semantics for dynamic logics of preference
[42], but in a special case where processes are used to give a
very richly descriptive dynamics.
The use of a utility restricts the ordinal preference rela-
tions that can be represented (in the usual way [25]), but
it is a trivial step to replace the utility comparisons in our
calculus with more general relational comparisons, if so re-
quired.
Our utility calculations are not required to be determined
by the system dynamics described by the transition system.
At a sum, an agent makes a decision as to its own (partial)
control (i.e., process) choice knowing its context, but not us-
ing information about the resulting future evolution of the
system. Even if an agent may face a sequence of decisions,
we are not forced to model it as undertaking a traditional,
rational, multi-stage decision process. The decoupling of
choice from dynamics should also make it possible to in-
corporate expected utility for probabilistic choices [41] in a
natural fashion. Traditional decision theory usually treats
decision situations in a flat, atomic way, and is not concerned
with similar choice-points in different contexts. Prior works
that address this issue include [21, 16].
Process calculi in which contexts are treated as first-class
citizens include [8, 40, 7, 39]. Logics of propositions in con-
text have also been extensively studied, for example [27].
Points of contact between decision theory and process cal-
culus include [15, 31, 3]. Our approach differs from these in
having an explicit utility-based choice constructor, which,
in particular, which takes into account the wider context.
The importance of the combination of utility and process in
reasoning about trust has also been recognized in [3].
4. A PROCESS ALGEBRAWITH UTILITY
In process calculi such as the one sketched in Section 1, the
behaviour of a composite process, such as E1×E2, is usually
defined in terms of the behaviours of its sub-processes, with
the reductions of E1 and E2 being independent of each other.
In our calculus, however, choices take account of the context
in which sub-processes are reduced, so that the reductions
of E1 and E2 may not be independent.
To see how this works, consider the example used in the
utility expressions (1) in Section 3. The process a : A+ub : B
reduces taking account of its context G. We annotate the
context in which a process is reduced on the underside of
the reduction arrow (e.g., R, a : A+u b : B −−−−→
S,[ ]×G
a R′, A),
where [ ] denotes the hole into which a : A+u b : B may be
substituted to regain the complete system (a : A+u b : B)×
G, and S are the resources allocated toG. Note also that any
choices in [ ]×G may depend on what process is substituted
into the hole [ ]. We therefore annotate the process that
is substituted, into the process being reduced, on top of
the reduction arrow; for example, S, [ ] × G R,a:A+ub:B−−−−−−−−→
b
S′, [ ]×G′.
So, the key judgement of the reduction relation for pro-
cesses with utility is of the form
C
C2−−→
C1
a
C′, (2)
which denotes how a context C, that exists in a system that
can be decomposed as C1(C(C2)), reduces. We refer to C
as the (primary) context, C1 as the outer context, and C2 as
the substituted, or inner context. Intuitively this denotes the
reduction of one part, C, of an entire system, C1(C(C2)).
In order to reason compositionally we wish to be able to
describe the reduction of C independently and structurally.
As choices can take account of context, this is not possible.
The choices in C, however, only make use of the definition
of C1 and C2, and disregard their structure. Hence we do
not need to reason over the structure of C1 and C2, as we do
with C, only to record their definitions which can then be
referred to at choice points. They are therefore annotated
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on the reduction arrow for reference, but are not reduced in
said relation.
We now describe the theoretical set-up in detail. Assume
a set U of symbols, called formal utilities, with a distin-
guished element 0U , called the neutral utility. Processes are
generated by the grammar:
E ::= 1 | [ ] | a : E |
∑
i∈I
u Ei | E × E.
These are really process contexts: the term [ ] is a hole into
which other processes may be substituted. For this work, it
turns out to be convenient to develop contexts as first-class
citizens rather than merely meta-theoretic tools.
The choice
∑
i∈I
u Ei is new: it describes situations in which
an agent has a choice between alternatives Ei indexed by
a i ∈ I, and its preference (in a larger context) is codified
by the utility u ∈ U . The infix operator E +u F may be
used for binary sums, and the subscript u may be dropped
when u = 0U . The zero process 0 is defined to be the sum
indexed by the empty set and the neutral utility. The zero
process, unit process 1, and synchronous products E×F are
well-known in process calculus, as are prefixes a : E, where
a ∈ Act.
A process E is well-formed if it contains at most one hole
and that hole is not guarded by action prefixes. The process
E is closed if it has no holes and open otherwise. Let PCont
be the set of all well-formed processes, PCCont be the set
of all closed well formed processes, and POCont be the set
of all open well-formed processes.
Let R be a resource monoid and μ be a fixed modification
function, as defined in Section 2. Define the products of sets
Cont = R× PCont, CCont = R× PCCont and OCont =
R × POCont. The letter C is reserved for contexts. De-
fine C∅ = e, [ ]. Brackets will be freely used to disambiguate
both processes and contexts. For C = R,E, the notational
abuses C × F = R, (E × F ) and C +u F = R, (E +u F )
will sometimes be used. Substitution in processes, E(F ),
replaces all occurrences of [ ] in E with F ; for example,
(([ ]+uE)×G)(F ) = (F +uE)×G. Substitution of contexts
C1(C2), where C1 = R,E and C2 = S, F , is defined as fol-
lows: if E is open, then C1(C2) = R ◦ S,E(F ), where E(F )
is process substitution; if E is closed, then C1(C2) = C1.
We assume that, for each formal utility u ∈ U , there is an
associated, real-valued utility function u : Cont −→ R [24]
that fixes an interpretation for each formal symbol u ∈ U .
The identically zero function is associated with 0U . Hence-
forth, we do not distinguish between formal utilities and
their utility functions.
The operational semantics of our process-utility calculus
is given in Figure 1. The side-condition (S
∑
) is that C3 =
C1((e,
∑
I\j
u Ei(C2)) +u [ ]) and ∀i ∈ I.u(C1(R,Ei(C2))) ≤
u(C1(R,Ej(C2))). The side-condition (S×) is that C3 =
C1((S, F (C2))× [ ]) and C4 = C1((R,E(C2))× [ ]).
The unit process always ticks, effecting no change. The
prefix process evolves via its head action. The hole rule is a
technical one used to terminate reduction derivations of open
contexts. The sum process
∑
I
u Ei represents a preference-
based choice by the agent: it follows the behaviour of any
of its constituent Ej which has at least as high a value as-
cribed by its utility u as any other option Ei for i ∈ I. The
R,1
C2−−→
C1
1
R,1
(Tick)
R, a : E
C2−−→
C1
a
μ(a,R), E
(Prefix)
C2
(e,1)a−−−−→
C1
C′2
e, [ ]
C2−−→
C1
1
e, [ ]
(Hole)
(S
∑
)
R,Ej
C2−−→
C3
a
S, F
R,
∑
I
u Ei
C2−−→
C1
a
S, F
(Sum)
(S×)
R,E
C2−−→
C3
a
R′, E′ S, F
C2−−→
C4
b
S′, F ′
R ◦ S,E × F C2−−→
C1
ab
R′ ◦ S′, E′ × F ′
(Prod)
Figure 1: Operational Semantics
first special case of the sum is for the zero process 0, which
never evolves. The second special case is where u = 0U
and the sum becomes an ordinary non-deterministic sum: in
this case, the utility is irrelevant, and the sum may evolve
as any of its component processes. The product evolves two
processes synchronously in parallel, according to the decom-
position of the associated resources. An important feature
of this system is that contextual information about conclu-
sions is propagated up to premisses. In the product case,
information about each premiss is propagated up from the
conclusion to the other premiss, so that derivations of tran-
sitions occur in context.
To demonstrate how contextual decisions can be utilized
in modelling, we give a simple example (inspired by [5]. Con-
sider a banker who has a presentation (for a client, that
includes confidential business data) on a USB drive. The
banker may chose to access the drive or not, depending on
the situation. The banker is modelled as a process
Banker = present : Banker′ +uB idleB : Banker
′, (3)
where uB represents its preferences. The banker may be
willing to access the presentation when visiting a client, on
the assumption that the client’s network is firewalled, so
making the document safe from attack. In order to do so,
however, the banker must be given access to a computer by
the client. The client is modelled as
Client = logIn : Client′ +0U idleC : Client
′, (4)
which, for simplicity, makes a non-deterministic choice be-
tween logging the guest in and idling. The interaction be-
tween the banker and the client is a form of joint access
control, in which the banker cannot show the presentation
without having been logged in, and the client cannot see the
presentation unless the banker accesses it. Here we can show
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that the principals co-operate to access the presentation:
R,Client×Banker logIn,present−−−−−−−−−→S,Client′×Banker′.
(5)
If the banker’s utility is uB , then we have
uB(R,Client× (idleB : Banker′)) ≤
uB(R,Client× (present : Banker′)). (6)
In a different situation — here, a different context — the
banker may make a different decision. The banker may use a
home computer, compromised by an attacker, who wants to
steal the presentation, but cannot unless the banker accesses
it from the USB stick. The attacker is modelled as
Attacker = steal : Attacker′ +0U idleA : Attacker
′. (7)
In this situation, the banker prefers to idle than to work
on the presentation. As, in order for the attacker to steal
the presentation the banker must access it, and the banker
choses not to, then the attacker must also idle, so that
R,Attacker ×Banker idleA,idleB−−−−−−−→ S,Attacker′ ×Banker′.
(8)
Here the banker’s utility yields
uB(R,Attacker × (present : Banker′)) ≤
uB(R,Attacker × (idleB : Banker′)). (9)
A more detailed exposition of these examples is presented
in Appendix A.
A fundamental aspect of process calculus is the ability to
reason equationally about behavioural equivalence of pro-
cesses [28]. We now adapt these notions to suit the calculus
above, which incorporates ideas from [12, 9, 11].
The bisimilarity (or bisimulation) relation ∼ ⊆ PCont×
PCont is the largest binary relation such that, if E ∼ F ,
then ∀a ∈ Act, ∀R,R′, S, T ∈ R, and for all G,H, I, J ∈
PCont with G ∼ I and H ∼ J , then
1. ∀E′ ∈ PCont, if R,E T,H−−−→
S,G
a
R′, E′ then ∃F ′ such that
R,F
T,J−−→
S,I
a
R′, F ′ and E′ ∼ F ′, and
2. ∀F ′ ∈ PCont, if R,F T,J−−→
S,I
a
R′, F ′ then ∃E′ such that
R,E
T,H−−−→
S,G
a
R′, E′ and E′ ∼ F ′.
The union of any set of relations that satisfy these two con-
ditions also satisfies these conditions, so the largest such
relation is well-defined. Define ∼ ⊆ Cont × Cont by: if
E ∼ F then R,E ∼ R,F for all R ∈ R and E,F ∈ Cont.
Definition 1. A utility, u, respects bisimilarity if, for
all C1, C2 ∈ Cont, C1 ∼ C2 implies u(C1) = u(C2).
That is, behaviourally equivalent (bisimilar) states are re-
quired to be indistinguishable by u. The set U of utilities
respects bisimilarity if every u ∈ U respects bisimilarity.
Henceforth utilities are assumed to respect bisimilarity. We
can show that if bisimilar contexts are substituted into each
other, then the result is bisimilar:
Proposition 1. If E ∼ G and F ∼ H, then E(F ) ∼
G(H).
We can then prove a key property for reasoning composi-
tionally.
Theorem 1 (Bisimulation Congruence). The rela-
tion ∼ is a congruence. It is reflexive, symmetric and tran-
sitive, and for all a,E, F,G with E ∼ F , and all families
(Ei)i∈I , (Fi∈I)I with Ei ∼ Fi for all i ∈ I, a : E ∼ a : F ,
E ×G ∼ F ×G, and ∑
i∈I
u Ei ∼
∑
i∈I
u Fi.
Proof. Symmetry, reflexivity, and transitivity are straight-
forward. Prefixed processes a : E and a : F can only reduce
via an a action to E and F , which are bisimilar.
Consider the choices E +u G and F +u G, in (bisimilar)
outer contexts C1 and C2, with (bisimilar) inner contexts C3
and C4, and the case where R,E +u G
C2−−→
C1
a
S,E′. By the
(Sum) rule we know that u(C1(R,G(C2))) ≤ u(C1(R,E(C2)))
and that R,E
C2−−→
C5
a
S,E′, where C5 = C1((e,G(C2)) +u [ ]).
Let C6 = C3((e,G)(C4)+u[ ]); we can show that C5 ∼ C6 (by
Proposition 1), and hence that R,F
C4−−→
C6
a
S, F ′. By Propo-
sition 1 we know that C1(R,E(C2)) ∼ C3(R,F (C4)). Us-
ing Proposition 1, and the fact that utility functions respect
bisimilarity we can show that u(C3(R,G(C4))) ≤ u(C3(R,F
(C4))), and hence that R,F +u G
C4−−→
C3
a
S, F ′.
The product case follows from the fact that the contexts in
which each sub-process reduces, such as C1((S,G(C2))× [ ])
for E, is bisimilar to the context in which the counterpart
reduces, for example C3((S,G(C4))× [ ]) for F , by Proposi-
tion 1.
In order to reason equationally about processes, it is also
useful to establish various algebraic properties concerning
parallel composition and choice. We derive these below, for
our calculus. In order to do so, we make some additional
definitions concerning utility functions.
Definition 2. The set of utilities, U , is (algebraically)
accordant it respects bisimilarity and, for all u, v ∈ U , all
C,C1, C2, C3, C4 ∈ Cont, all E,F,G ∈ PCont, and R ∈ R,
1. u(C(R,F )) ≤ u(C(R,E)) and u(C(R,G)) ≤ u(C(R,E))
if and only if u(C(R,F +v G)) ≤ u(C(R,E)),
2. u(C(R,F )) ≤ u(C(R,E)) and u(C(R,G)) ≤ u(C(R,E))
if and only if u(C(R,G)) ≤ u(C(R,E +u F )).
3. for all R,E, u(C(R, 0)) ≤ u(C(R,E)), and
4. for all C1 ∼ C3, C2 ∼ C4, R,E, F,G, u(C1(R,E ×G+u
F ×G(C2))) = u(C3(R, (E +u F )×G(C4))).
We use the binary version of sum here in order to aid com-
prehension, but finite choices between sets of processes work
straightforwardly. Any real-valued function defined on the
quotient Cont/ ∼ defines a utility that respects bisimilarity.
Proposition 2 (Algebraic Properties). If U is ac-
cordant, then:
1 E +u F ∼ F +u E
2 E +u (F +u G) ∼ (E +u F ) +u G
3 E +u 0 ∼ E
4 E × 0 ∼ 0
5 E × 1 ∼ E
6 E × F ∼ F × E
7 E × (F ×G) ∼ (E × F )×G
8 (E +u F )×G ∼ E ×G+u F ×G.
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Proof. The interesting cases are: associativity of choice
(2) as it uses Definition 2.1 and 2.2, the unit of choice (3)
as it uses Definition 2.3, and distributivity of product over
choice (8), which uses Definition 2.4. The others are as
usual, and do not make use of the accordance properties.
As a representative of the interesting properties we prove
the associativity of choice. Consider the choices E+u (F +u
G) and (E +u F ) +u G, in (bisimilar) outer contexts C1
and C2, with (bisimilar) inner contexts C3 and C4, and the
case where R,E +u (F +u G)
C2−−→
C1
a
S,E′. By the (Sum) rule
we know that u(C1(R,F +u G(C2))) ≤ u(C1(R,E(C2))).
By the accordance properties (Def. 2.1) we then know that
u(C1(R,F
(C2))) ≤ u(C1(R,E(C2))) and u(C1(R,G(C2))) ≤ u(C1(R,
E(C2))).
Let C5 = C1((e, F +u G(C2))+u [ ]) and C6 = C3((e, F+u
G(C4)) +u [ ]); using Proposition 1 we can show that these
two contexts are bisimilar. By the (Sum) rule we know that,
as R,E+u(F+uG)
C2−−→
C1
a
S,E′, then R,E
C2−−→
C5
a
S,E′. So, by
the definition of bisimulation, we have that R,E
C4−−→
C6
a
S,E′.
As utility respects bisimilarity (Definition 1) we have that
u(C3(R,G(C4))) = u(C1(R,G(C2))) ≤ u(C1(R,E+uF (C2)))
= u(C3(R,E+u F (C4))), and that u(C3(R,F (C4))) = u(C1
(R,F (C2))) ≤ u(C1(R,E(C2))) = u(C3(R,E(C4))). Let
C7 = C3((e,G(C4)) +u [ ]). By (Sum) we can then show
that R,E +u F
C4−−→
C7
a
S,E′, and finally that R, (E +u F ) +u
G
C4−−→
C3
a
S,E′.
Future work includes extending the calculus to include
probabilistic choice [41] and expected utility [24]. It would
also be interesting to consider whether the (pre)sheaf-theoretic
semantics considered by Winskel [23] can be adapted to our
calculus.
5. A PROCESS LOGIC WITH UTILITY
We now introduce a modal logic of system properties. The
semantics is given using a satisfaction relation
C C′ φ,
where C is a closed context, C′ is a context and φ is a for-
mula of a (Hennessy–Milner-style) modal logic of processes:
this may be read ‘the primary context C satisfies φ in the
surrounding context C′’ (cf. (2)). The context C may sat-
isfy different logical propositions, perhaps even negations of
each other, when placed in different surrounding contexts;
an example of this is below. Context-sensitive logics have
been studied by other authors [26, 4]. The structural nature
of processes and resources provides a semantic framework in
which such logics seem particularly natural.
The propositions of the logic are defined by the grammar
φ ::= p | ⊥ |  | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ → φ |
〈a〉φ | [a]φ | I | φ ∗ φ | φ −∗ φ,
where p ranges over atomic propositions, and a over actions.
The symbols for propositions for truth, falsehood, negation
and (additive) conjunction, disjunction, and implication are
standard. The (additive) modal connectives are 〈a〉 and [a].
The connectives I, ∗, and −∗ are the multiplicative unit,
conjunction, and implication, respectively.
A valuation, V, is a function that maps each atomic propo-
sition to a ∼-closed set of closed contexts. The satisfaction
relation is specified in Figure 2.
In the interpretation of atoms, the surrounding context
is wrapped around the primary context, and the valuation
of the atom consulted to see if it contains this compound
context. This is what makes our logic context-sensitive. ,
⊥, ¬, ∧, ∨, and→ are all interpreted (essentially) classically.
The interpretation of the multiplicatives connectives here
is similar to that for the logic MBI in [12]. Recall also the
comments on ∗ in Section 1. The semantics of ∗ in Figure 2 is
slightly modified, because of the way that contextual infor-
mation is propagated upwards from conclusion to premisses
in the product rule of the operational semantics.
The standard interpretation of Hennessy–Milner logics uses
the relation specified by the operational semantics as a Kripke
structure to support the modal connectives. In our work,
the operational semantics is more complex: a context oc-
curs, and reduces alongside an outer context. Hence when
we consider whether C1 C2 〈a〉φ holds, we have to consider
whether there are reductions of the form C1
C∅−−→
C2
a
C′1 and
C2
C1−−→
C∅
b
C′2 such that C
′
1 C′2 φ. The occurrences of the
empty context ensure that no extraneous contextual infor-
mation is introduced into the reductions of interest. The [a]
modality is interpreted similarly.
Recall the example of the banker who decides which ac-
tions to take in different contexts (3-9). In a situation that
consists of a client (context CC), the banker chooses to ac-
cess the presentation, but in a situation that consists of an
attacker (context CA) the banker chooses not to: that is,
RB , Banker CC 〈present〉
RB , Banker CA ¬〈present〉. (10)
A derivation of these properties is in Appendix A. Hence, in
different contexts the process satisfies different propositions
that, moreover, would be inconsistent over the same context.
Behaviourally equivalent processes are also logically equiv-
alent (they satisfy the same logical properties). This is half
of the Hennessy–Milner property [19, 20].
Theorem 2. If C1 C2 φ, C1 ∼ C3, and C2 ∼ C4, then
C3 C4 φ.
Proof. A standard argument, by induction over the def-
inition of C1 C2 φ, using Proposition 1 in the cases where
contexts are extended.
Hence, bisimilar processes can be used interchangeably within
a larger system, without changing the logical properties of
the larger system.
It is unclear whether a useful converse can be obtained.
With restrictions on the available fragments of the logic,
and a different equivalence relation, however, it is possi-
ble to obtain a converse. To this end, we introduce the
local equivalence relation ≈ ⊆ (OCont× Cont× CCont)×
(OCont × Cont × CCont), the largest binary relation such
that, if C1, A,D1 ≈ C2, B,D2, ∀a ∈ Act where A = R,E
and B = S, F (with A′ and B′, etc., modifying them, as
usual), then
1. ∀C′1 ∈ OCont,A′ ∈ Cont,D′1 ∈ CCont, if A D1−−→
C1
a
A′
and C1
A(D1)−−−−→
C∅
c
C′1 and D1
C∅−−−−→
C1(A)
d
D′1 then ∃C′2 ∈
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C C′ p iff C′(C) ∈ V(p)
C C′ ⊥ never
C C′  always
C C′ ¬φ iff C 
C′ φ
C C′ φ ∧ ψ iff C C′ φ and C C′ ψ
C C′ φ ∨ ψ iff C C′ φ or C C′ ψ
C C′ φ → ψ iff C C′ φ implies C C′ ψ
C1 C2 〈a〉φ iff ∃ C′1, C′2, b such that if C1
C∅−−→
C2
a
C′1
and C2
C1−−→
C∅
b
C′2, then C
′
1 C′2 φ
C1 C2 [a]φ iff ∀ C′1, C′2, b such that if C1
C∅−−→
C2
a
C′1 and
C2
C1−−→
C∅
b
C′2, then C
′
1 C′2 φ
R,E C′ I iff R = e and E ∼ 1
R,E C′ φ ∗ ψ iff ∃ S, T , F , G such that R = S ◦ T , E ∼ F ×G, and
S, F C′(T,[ ]×G) φ and T,G C′(S,F×[ ]) ψ
R,E C′ φ−∗ ψ iff ∀ S, F such that R ◦ S is defined and S, F C′ φ,
R ◦ S,E × F C′ ψ
Figure 2: Interpretation of Propositional Formulae
OCont,B′ ∈ Cont,D′2 ∈ CCont such that B D2−−→
C2
a
B′
and C2
B(D2)−−−−→
C∅
c
C′2 andD2
C∅−−−−→
C2(B)
d
D′2 and C
′
1, A
′, D′1 ≈
C′2, B
′, D′2
2. ∀C′2 ∈ OCont,B′ ∈ Cont,D′2 ∈ CCont, if B D2−−→
C2
a
B′
and C2
B(D2)−−−−→
C∅
c
C′2 and D2
C∅−−−−→
C2(B)
d
D′2 then ∃C′1 ∈
OCont,A′ ∈ Cont,D′1 ∈ CCont such that A D1−−→
C1
a
A′
and C1
A(D1)−−−−→
C∅
c
C′1 andD1
C∅−−−−→
C1(A)
d
D′1 and C
′
1, A
′, D′1 ≈
C′2, B
′, D′2
3. R = S.
The union of any set of relations that satisfy these two con-
ditions also satisfies these conditions, so the largest such
relation is well-defined. We define C1, A ≈ C2, B whenever
C1, A,D ≈ C2, B,D, for all D.
Fundamentally, this equivalence relation starts from the
view that processes should be considered equivalent when-
ever they have the same behaviour given the same resources
and context. The local equivalence relation fails to be a
congruence, however, as it is not respected by the product
constructor, ×, for processes [9]. Therefore, we do not have
an analogue of Theorem 1 for local equivalence. (Note that,
in [12, 9, 11], the equivalence corresponding to the equiva-
lence ∼ taken here is referred to as the global equivalence.)
We can, however, obtain a version of the full Hennessy-
Milner theorem, provided we restrict the logic to the frag-
ment without −∗. The need for this restriction arises from the
failure of the local equivalence to be a congruence, because
the satisfaction relation for −∗ requires that two subsystems
be combined using ×.
Consider the fragment of the logic that excludes −∗. As-
sume that all atomic propositions are values as sets of con-
texts that are also closed under ≈. Alter the I and ∗ clauses
of the interpretation so that
C C1 I iff C1, C ≈ C1, (e,1)
C C1 φ ∗ ψ iff ∃ S, T and F , G such that C1, C ≈
C1, (S ◦ T, F ×G), and
S, F C2 φ and T,G C3 ψ,
where C2 = C
′(T, [ ]×G) and
C3 = C
′(S, F × [ ]).
Define two contexts (with accompanying outer contexts) to
be logically equivalent if they satisfy exactly the same set
of logical statements; that is, C1, A ≡ C2, B if and only if,
for all φ, A C1 φ iff B C2 φ. The following version of
Theorem 2 then holds:
Theorem 3. If C1, A,D1 ≈ C2, B,D2, then C1, A(D1) ≡
C2, B(D2).
Proof. Standard, by induction over the definition of
A(D1) C1 φ, using a forward-only analogous version of
Proposition 1 for ≈, in the cases where contexts are ex-
tended.
We can now also obtain a converse, for the local equiv-
alence relation. Define a context to be image finite if it
has finitely many immediate derivatives (for any given inner
and outer contexts with which it reduces). We then have
the following.
Theorem 4. If C1, A ≡ C2, B, then there exist A1, D1,
B1, D2 such that A = A1(D1), B = B1(D2), and C1, A1, D1
≈ C2, B1, D2.
Proof. By contradiction. Take the finite set of contexts
C that can be obtained through the reduction of B1(D2) in
outer context C2 (with an empty inner context). If this
set is empty, then we can show that A1(D1) C1 〈a〉
and B1(D2) 
C2 〈a〉, which contradicts the premiss that
C1, A ≡ C2, B. If the set is non-empty, then we can con-
struct characteristic formulae φi for each context in C, such
that the result of reducing A1(D1) in C1 satisfies the for-
mula, but the result of reducing B1(D2) in C2 does not. We
can combine these to show that A1(D1) C1 〈a〉(φ1∧...∧φn)
and B1(D2) 
C2 〈a〉(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn), which again contradicts
the premiss that C1, A ≡ C2, B.
We remark that the usefulness of this result is limited by
the failure of local equivalence to be a congruence. It is a
strictly local reasoning tool.
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Since each utility function u induces a preference relation
u on closed contexts, the language could easily be enriched
with preference modalities such as 〈u〉 and [u] in the style
of dynamic preference logic [42]. Consider the necessitated
formula, [u]φ, which denotes that any context that is val-
ued at least as much as the current context (in the outer
context) satisfies property φ. Formally, this is interpreted
as
C C′ [u]φ iff for all C′′, C′(C) u C′(C′′) implies
C′′ C′ φ.
These modalities can interact powerfully with existing struc-
tural operators.
In game-theoretic approaches to security, the notion of a
level of security is important. That is, if a defender chooses
to perform some defensive action, then no matter what a
given attacker does, the defender is guaranteed to maintain
at least a certain level of security. With preference modali-
ties we can make statements relevant to security levels. For
example, if a defensive measure d is in place, then every
better state for an attacker (which would be chosen by the
attacker) involves not attacking. To see this, consider the
proposition
φ−∗ [d][v](¬〈a〉),
where the attacker is characterized by the property φ and
has preference function v. The multiplicative implication
operator permits us to reason about substitution within ar-
bitrary contexts, and hence of the efficacy of defensive mea-
sures relative to an arbitrary (partially) described attacker.
The logic might also be enriched to handle expected utility
[24]. Quantitative path-based logical properties of Markov
Chains are studied in [22]: they can reason about complex
notions, such as average utility with a given time discount,
but do not provide compositionality results over model struc-
tures. A more extensive study of such extensions is future
work.
6. TRUST DOMAINS
An agent, situated within a system that contains also
other agents, may establish a part of the system, or a col-
lection of other agents within the system, that it trusts.
Similarly, a system’s designer or manager might establish a
collection of parts of the system such that, within any given
part, the agents trust one another. We shall refer to such a
part of the system, or such a collection of agents, as a ‘trust
domain’.
The term ‘trust domain’ is in use in range of settings, such
as the Trusted Computing Project (www.trustedcomputing.
org.uk), the Open Trusted Computing (OpenTC) consor-
tium (www.opentc.net), and the ‘Trust Domains’ project
(www.hpl.hp.com/research/cloud_security/TrustDomains.
pdf). The literature on models of trust is very large and can-
not be surveyed in this short article, but a good survey with
a relevant perspective for us is [36].
In this section, we consider how the process-utility calcu-
lus might be used to characterize a notion of a ‘trust do-
main’. Within a system model, with an agent is represented
as a process, at any given point in the agent’s execution, the
process is associated with a location (which we suppress for
now) within the system and has access to a collection of re-
sources. That is, the agent has a state. As described above,
the agent is also associated with a utility function. Here we
interpret the utility function as a loss function, associating
a cost kE(ai) with each choice ai that is made as a process
executes, so that the trace σ of the process that describes
agent E gives the total cost K of an agent E’s execution:
KE(σ) =
∑
σ=a1,...,ak
kE(ai). (11)
For now, we consider just finite traces.
The intended situation is depicted in Figure 6. Here the
need for the concept of location should be apparent. Indeed,
a logical or physical location would seem to be an essential
component of the intended notion of domain. Informally,
located agents manipulate their resource environments, but,
in our formulation, they do so in contexts which characterize
the extent to which they do so whilst maintaining a required
logical property (intuitively, the ‘trust’ property) within a
specified bound on cost. This approach stands in contrast
to approaches in which constraints are expressed purely in
terms of preferences, where impossible choices, that can be
expressed logically in our setting, must represented by ‘in-
finitely negative’ utility. For brevity, we will not employ
location explicitly, along the lines of the discussion in Sec-
tion 2, instead trusting that the intuitions suggested in Fig-
ure 6 will make a sufficiently strong suggestion.
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Figure 3: Iso-utilities and Trust Domains
Here the agent E may be given one of two different choices
of cost (utility) function. If KE = K, then F is not within
E’s trust domain at either the K1 or K2 levels. If, however,
KE = L, then F is within E’s trust domain at the L2, but
not at the L1 level. Agent F ’s cost function, M , includes
agent G at theM2 level, but not at theM1 level (M1 ≤ M2).
F ′ is in no-one’s domain at any of the given levels of utility.
The formal definition of a trust domain is set up, using the
process-utility calculus, for an agent E together with a prop-
erty φ required (by the agent or by the designer/manager)
of the part of the system or collection of agents that is to be
trusted, the agent’s utility function KE , which assigns val-
ues to choices made as the agent executes, and a bound K
on the total cost of the trace, which characterizes the total
acceptable cost to the agent in reaching or interacting with
other parts of the system or other agents within it.
The trust domain is then constructed as a collection of
contexts within which the agent may evolve whilst main-
taining the properties by which it determines trust. Two
properties are required to establish a viable definition. First,
a bound K on the cost that E is prepared to incur. Second,
a propositional assertion φ about the state to which E can
evolve within that cost constraint. So, if R is the resource
initially associated with E, then we can define, building on
(11),
TD(E, φ,KE ,K) =
{
C | there exist closed F and trace
σ such that R,E
(e,1)−−−→
C
σ
S, F
and S, F |=C′ φ
and KE(σ) ≤ K
}
, (12)
where the resource S is that which is derived from R by the
the trace σ and C
R,E−−→
C
σ′
C′, where σ′ is the trace of context
actions corresponding to σ.
Notice that the inner context is empty, so imposing no
restriction on the evolutions considered. More generally, in
further research, we could generalize the definition to con-
sider trust domains for agents A with non-empty inner con-
texts, corresponding to a degree of under-specification. A
richer treatment of logical satisfaction would then be needed.
Extending our banking example, we can give a simple
sketch of how trust domains work. Consider a process
Banker × Lawyer × P, (13)
where P is either Attacker or Client, and where we modify
Banker and introduce Lawyer, as follows:
Banker = shareL : Banker′ +K notshareL : Banker
′
Lawyer = 1 : (shareP : Lawyer′ +L notshareP : Lawyer
′).
In terms of Figure 6, Banker corresponds to A, Lawyer
to B, and P to C. Letting Banker’s cost be L, Lawyer’s
cost be M , and letting shareL, shareC, and shareA, etc.,
be the evident sharing (of data, say) actions with lawyer,
client, and attacker, we obtain
L(shareL : Banker′ × 1 : Lawyer × 1 : Attacker) ≥
L(notshareL : Banker′ × 1 : Lawyer × 1 : Attacker),
but
L(shareL : Banker′ × 1 : Lawyer × 1 : Client) ≤
L(notshareL : Banker′ × 1 : Lawyer × 1 : Client),
and
M(1 : Banker′ × shareA : Lawyer × 1 : Attacker) ≥
M(1 : Banker′ × notshareA : Lawyer × 1 : Attacker),
but
M(1 : Banker′ × shareC : Lawyer × 1 : Client) ≤
M(1 : Banker′ × notshareC : Lawyer × 1 : Client),
and see that Banker’s trust domain for sharing will include
Lawyer and Client, but not Attacker.
Here, the proposition φ in (12) would be something like
φBanker = ‘the bank retains a good credit rating while shar-
ing data’. Different φ’s give different domains.
We remark that work in the economics tradition would
tend to code propositional constraints within utility, and
that work in logic would tend to code utility constraints
propositionally. In our setting, the structure provided by the
Hennessy–Milner-style logic suggests it is natural to main-
tain the distinction between utility and logical properties.
Further work from this section is to consider information
flow [1, 4] between trust domains.
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. . .
RB , present : Banker
′ C1−−→
C
p
C
present
RB , Banker
′
(Prefix) uB(R,Client × (idleB : Banker′)) ≤
uB(R,Client × (present : Banker′))
RB , Banker
C1−−→
CC
present
RB , Banker
′
(Sum)
RC ◦ RB , Client × Banker C1−−→
C∅
logIn,present
μ((logIn, present), RC ◦ RB), Client′ × Banker′
(Prod)
where C1 = e, 1, CC = RC , Client × [ ], CpC = RC , Client × ([ ] +uB idleB : Banker′)
Figure 4: Banker choice in Client context
. . .
RB , idleB : Banker
′ C1−−→
Ci
A
idleB
RB , Banker
′
(Prefix) uB(R,Attacker × (present : Banker′)) ≤
uB(R,Attacker × (idleB : Banker′))
RB , Banker
C1−−→
CA
idleB
RB , Banker
′
(Sum)
RA ◦ RB , Attacker × Banker C1−−→
C∅
idleA,idleB
μ((idleA, idleB), RA ◦ RB), Attacker′ × Banker′
(Prod)
where C1 = e, 1, CA = RA, Attacker × [ ], CiA = RA, Attacker × (present : Banker′ +uB [ ])
Figure 5: Banker choice in Attacker context
APPENDIX
A. DERIVATIONS OF EXAMPLES
We provide a detailed derivation of the examples intro-
duced in Equations 3–10. This example consists of situation-
ally dependent choices that make use of joint access control.
In order to encode the joint access control, we make use of
semaphore resources. We let Rs stand for sets of atomic re-
sources, such as Acnt, USB, ris, etc., and make use of the
ρ notation [12, 11], defined by
ρ(a) = min {R | μ(a,R) ↓},
to denote which resources are required for the modification
function to be defined for a given action:
ρ(logIn) = {Acnt, r1} = RC ρ(idleC) = {r2}
ρ(present) = {USB, r2} = RB ρ(idleB) = {r1}.
This ensures that the idleC and present actions, and the
idleB and logIn actions, cannot co-occur in a reduction, as
they require the same semaphore resources. We then define
the modification function for each action:
μ(logIn,RC) = RC μ(idleC , {r2}) = {r2}
μ(present,RB) = RB μ(idleB , {r2}) = {r2}.
Let R = {Acnt, r1, USB, r2}. In order to denote our prefer-
ence of giving the presentation over idling, in the presence
of the client and the absence of the attacker, we define a
portion of the banker’s preference function as
uB(R,Client× (present : Banker′)) = 0.7
uB(R,Client× (idleB : Banker′)) = 0.5.
We then have the reduction
RC ◦RB , Client×Banker C1−−→
C∅
logIn,present
μ((logIn, present), RC ◦RB), Client′ ×Banker′,
as derived in Figure 4. We also have the property
RB , Banker CC 〈present〉.
This can be derived using the satisfaction relation in Fig-
ure 2, specifically the case for the diamond modality, as
RB , Banker
C1−−→
CC
present
μ((present), RB), Banker
′,
by Figure 4.
In order to encode the joint access control we make use of
semaphore resources, as defined which resources are required
for the attacker’s actions:
ρ(attack) = {r1} = RA ρ(idleA) = {r2}.
and define the modification function for the attackers actions
μ(attack,RA) = RA μ(idleA, {rc}) = {rc}
To express the banker’s preference to idle in the presence
of an attacker, we define a further portion of its preference
function, and give a higher utility to idling in such a situa-
tion:
uB(R,Attacker × (present : Banker′)) = 0.1
uB(R,Attacker × (idleB : Banker′)) = 0.2.
Here we have the reduction
RA ◦RB , Attacker ×Banker C1−−→
C∅
idleA,idleB
μ((idleA, idleA), RA ◦RB), Client′ ×Banker′
as derived in Figure 5. We also have the following property:
RB , Banker CA ¬〈present〉.
This can be derived using the satisfaction relation in Fig-
ure 2. By the diamond modality, as RB , Banker 
 C1−−→
CA
present
,
by Figure 4, we have that Rb, Banker 
CA 〈present〉.
Then the property follows directly by the interpretation of
negation.
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